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Abstract 
Due to the shortage of affordable housing in the United States, an increasing number of renters are 
struggling to maintain housing stability. However, few explanations exist for why some renters keep 
housing in response to increasing-housing-cost burdens where others involuntarily relocate. Applying 
hybrid models to a nationwide panel dataset, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this study 
estimates the effects of economic security, mobility, family composition, and personal vulnerabilities on 
involuntary residential mobility. The findings show that renters are more likely to experience involuntary 
residential mobility due to job insecurity, a deterioration in health conditions, a lack of savings, an 
absence of an automobile, living with non-family members, and more children within a family. These 
findings contribute to understanding variations in ability to maintain housing stability in the private 
housing market that is increasingly tight and inform housing researchers, policymakers, and local 
practitioners seeking the most effective intervention for preventing housing instability and its negative 
consequences. 
Introduction 
Due to rising housing costs, stagnated or declining incomes, and a lack of federal housing 
assistance, a number of renting families suffer from severe housing-cost burdens (Desmond, 
2015). In 2014, 49 percent of all renters were cost burdened, paying more than 30 percent of 
their household incomes for housing costs, and 24 percent of the renters were severely cost 
burdened, spending more than half of their household incomes on housing costs (Joint Center for 
Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2015). Although the lack of affordable housing is 
commonplace, federal housing assistance is substantially insufficient; only 24 percent of the 19 
million families eligible for the federal housing assistance are receiving any type of housing 
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supports (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2013). The rest of them have 
to fend for themselves in the private housing market that is increasingly tight. 
As a result of these trends, housing circumstances among low-income renters, perhaps 
lying at the bottom of rental housing markets have become highly unstable. Housing instability, 
as the antithesis of housing stability, usually refers to a variety of housing circumstances where 
families do not have enough control over their residential environments, so they have to move at 
undesirable times to undesirable places (Beer, 2011; Grier & Grier, 1978; Newman & Owen, 
1982; Wiesel, 2014). In many studies, housing instability refers to various housing conditions, 
such as (1) circumstances where families suffer from high-housing-cost burdens, (2) situations 
where households reside in overcrowded or doubled-up housing, or (3) a harbinger of 
homelessness (Burgard, Seefeldt, & Zelner, 2012; ICPH, 2011; Reid, Vittinghoff, & Kushel, 
2008; Rollins et al., 2012; Suglia, Duarte, & Sandel, 2011; Tsemberis, McHugo, Williams, 
Hanrahan, & Stefancic, 2007; Vijayaraghavan, Jacobs, Seligman, & Fernandez, 2011). Housing 
instability is often manifested in a sequence of residential moves that are unexpected, 
unintentional, and involuntary (Cohen & Wardrip, 2011; Phinney, 2013; Skelton, 2002).  
A large amount of evidence consistently shows that an increasing number of low-income 
renters involuntarily leave their housing (Coulton, Theodos, & Turner, 2009; Desmond & 
Shollenberger, 2015; Phinney, 2009). For example, in Milwaukee, more than one of every eight 
renters experienced forced moves due to formal or informal eviction, landlord foreclosure, or 
building condemnation, from 2009 to 2011(Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015). Evidence from the 
Women’s Employment Study (WES) shows that, among female welfare recipients with children, 
one of every five families moved six or more times during a six-year period—or equivalently, at 
least once a year—and almost 40 percent of the families experienced forced moves—due to 
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eviction, homelessness, or doubling up—during the same period (Phinney, 2009). According to 
the Making Connections Initiative, a survey of low-income communities in 10 American cities, 
46 percent of all families that changed their addresses during a three-year period moved in 
response to financial stress or problems in their rental housing arrangements (Coulton et al., 
2009).  
The prevalence of housing instability matters: housing instability is not just a 
consequence of poverty, but also a significant source of many problems that the poor face. 
Housing instability can negatively affect the educational environments of children (Cohen & 
Wardrip, 2011; Crowley, 2003), employment and job performance (Desmond & Gershenson, 
2016a), physical and mental health (Burgard et al., 2012; Desmond & Kimbro, 2015; Rollins et 
al., 2012), social relationships, and subjective well-being (Oishi, 2010). At the neighborhood 
level, housing instability is associated with high rates of school turnover, neighborhood and 
community instability, and the concentration of poverty (Desmond, 2016).  
Despite the prevalence of housing instability and its detrimental impacts, the question of 
how renters increasingly fail to maintain housing stability in the private rental housing market 
remains largely unanswered (Lubell, 2015). A few studies have examined unstable housing 
circumstances of poor families (S. Clark, 2010; Desmond, 2016; Skobba & Goetz, 2013). These 
studies do provide some insights into various circumstances wherein renting families suffer from 
housing instability: for example, a variety of reasons that force renting families to move out (S. 
Clark, 2010), various types of shared living arrangements among very low-income renters 
(Skobba & Goetz, 2013), or formal or informal conflicts between tenants and their landlords 
(Desmond, 2016). However, because these studies heavily rely on detailed interviews or surveys 
based on a small fraction of renting families, mostly very poor families, they barely explain how 
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typical their sample families are, to what extent their findings can be generalized, and how 
renters increasingly fail to maintain housing stability even though they were stably housed 
before.  
For a number of housing policy researchers, how low-income households move has been 
an important subject. Numerous studies have examined public-driven residential displacement 
largely caused by housing redevelopment projects, or mobility patterns among subsidized 
households in particular policy contexts; for example, location outcomes among voucher holders 
(Galvez, 2011), among HOPE VI relocates (Kleit & Galvez, 2011), or among participants in the 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration (Rosenblatt & DeLuca, 2012). Considering the 
long-lasting federal housing policies intended to disperse concentrated urban poverty (Goetz, 
2003), this focus is reasonable. However, outside of the focus on subsidized renters, private-
driven residential displacement occurring in the private rental housing market has been largely 
neglected, even though the majority of renting families suffer from a lack of affordable housing 
choices for long-stay housing—much before they consider moving to neighborhoods with high 
opportunities.  
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) clearly sets housing 
stability as one of policy goals for “vulnerable population” (U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 2014, p. 8). Yet, few explanations exist about what conditions renters 
should meet for housing stability in the private market. In many policy contexts, housing stability 
is often assumed that it would be achieved if housing policies provide affordable housing with 
decent residential quality (e.g., Cunningham & MacDonald (2012)). Under this assumption, 
many housing researchers have strived to figure out how to provide affordable units in an 
efficient way. However, an increasing amount of evidence—which will be discussed in detail 
5 
 
below—suggest that the condition for housing stability may be much complicated than 
previously thought. To be specific, increasing-housing-cost-burdens cause the displacement of 
some families and not others (Desmond & Gershenson, 2016b). If involuntary residential 
mobility (IRM) is not a simple consequence of a high housing cost burden, what other factors 
exist behind the housing burden? Finding answers to this question can be a prerequisite for the 
effective design of housing and social policies.  
This study aims to explain variations in ability to maintain housing stability in the private 
rental market. To do so, this study empirically evaluates the effects of the potential household 
characteristics that could affect involuntary residential mobility but have been largely overlooked 
in the context of housing instability through testing several hypotheses about: (1) economic 
security (i.e., job stability, health conditions, and wealth), (2) mobility (i.e., car ownership), (3) 
family composition (i.e., shared living arrangements with families and non-families), and (4) 
personal vulnerabilities (i.e., racial minorities, immigrants, and families with children).By 
applying hybrid models to the nationwide panel dataset known as the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), this study contributes to understanding variations in ability to maintain 
housing stability and informs housing researchers, policymakers, and local practitioners seeking 
the most effective intervention for preventing housing instability and its negative consequences. 
The Duality of Residential Mobility among Renting Families 
For several decades, the large body of literature on residential mobility has tended to view 
residential mobility as an event that occurs voluntarily, and as an instrumental goal for 
generating wellbeing (Dieleman, 2001; Quercia & Rohe, 1993; Rossi, 1955; Speare, 1974). 
According to the classic residential attainment view, residential mobility has been regarded as 
“the process by which families adjust their housing to the housing needs that are generated by the 
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shifts in family composition that accompany life cycle changes.” (Rossi, 1955, p. 9) This 
perspective explains the large portion of residential moves that occur voluntarily and entail the 
improvement of residential environments, such as changing from being a renter to being a 
homeowner, or transitioning from a low-quality unit to a high-quality unit (W. Clark, Deurloo, & 
Dieleman, 2003). However, in current rental housing circumstances, where the number of low-
income renters suffering from high-housing-cost burdens has surged beyond precedent, housing 
researchers increasingly emphasize the need for an alternative view that explains residential 
mobility in the context of housing instability (Coulton et al., 2009; Desmond, Gershenson, & 
Kiviat, 2015; Kleit, Kang, & Scally, 2016; Phinney, 2013; Skobba & Goetz, 2013). 
In responding to the growing demand for an alternative view on residential mobility, 
Desmond and his colleagues (2015) propose a U-shaped relationship between household income 
and residential mobility. At one side of the relationship, renting families are likely to move 
(voluntary mobility) as their incomes increase, whereas as their incomes decrease, they are likely 
to be immobile (immobility/housing stability) due to decreasing housing options that they can 
afford. This pattern supports the conventional residential attainment perspective, arguing that 
residential mobility is a change for better well-being or living environments. At the other side of 
the relationship, as households’ incomes decline further, they are more likely to be displaced 
because they cannot afford their current dwellings (involuntary mobility), whereas as their 
incomes increase, they are likely to stay (immobility/housing stability). Desmond and his 
colleagues (2015) call this alternative relationship between income and mobility the residential 
instability perspective. This U-shaped relationship provides some insight into the double-sided 
meaning of residential mobility (Coulton et al., 2009). Residential mobility can be a symptom of 
positive changes in a family’s circumstances, such as being a homeowner for the first time, 
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moving to be close to a workplace, or trading up to a larger or better-quality housing unit. 
However, it can also be a symptom of housing instability, such as making consecutive moves 
due to eviction.  
Much empirical evidence have identified these two different meanings embedded in low-
income renters’ residential moves (S. Clark, 2010; Coulton et al., 2009; Desmond & 
Shollenberger, 2015; Skobba & Goetz, 2013). For example, evidence from the Making 
Connections Initiative—focusing on low-income communities in 10 cities—suggests that, 
although 46 percent of all low-income renters who relocated during a three-year period were 
“churning movers,” who moved frequently due to financial stress or problems in their rental 
housing arrangements, 30 percent of the movers were “up-and-out movers,” who moved to new 
neighborhoods with low-poverty (Coulton et al., 2009, p. 12).  
Even after these pioneering studies, many questions remain unanswered in the 
relationship between housing affordability and housing instability: Is residential mobility as a 
symptom of housing instability a simple consequence of an increasing-housing-cost-burden? 
Why can some people keep their housing in response to increasing-housing-cost burdens, 
whereas others involuntarily move out?  
Determinants of Involuntary Residential Mobility 
Existing studies have pointed out that housing choices for long-stay housing are highly limited, 
not just by monetary factors, but also by a broader set of destabilizing sources. However, few 
works have evaluated potential factors that influence residential mobility that occurs 
involuntarily. To challenge the presumption that renters involuntarily move out only because of 
increasing-housing-cost-burdens and specific the determinants addressed in this study, this 
section introduces a list of determinants of involuntary residential mobility. In choosing the 
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determinants, this study particularly focuses on the factors that have been widely known as 
constraints that many low-income households often confront in various contexts, but have not 
been conceptually and empirically linked to involuntary residential mobility. These factors are 
mainly derived from the review of several pioneering studies on household characteristics that 
are likely to be exposed to unstable housing circumstances—though defined by different 
measures. The factors reflect ability to have housing options that renters can maintain their 
residence at the first place, as well as ability to maintain their housing.  
Economic Security 
Hypothesis 1a. All else equal, a renter will be more likely to experience involuntary residential 
mobility if the renter is unstably employed. Economic security is an essential condition for most 
renters to maintain housing stability. Low-income families tend to work in entry-level, low-wage 
jobs that are less likely to be protected from termination, so their financial conditions can be 
insecure due to irregular working hours or insecure employment (Kalleberg, 2009). Evidence 
from the Milwaukee Area Renters Study (MARS) suggests that job loss is a valid predictor of 
eviction; to be specific, renting families who have lost their jobs are approximately twice as 
likely to be evicted than the average Milwaukee renter (Desmond & Gershenson, 2016b). 
Desmond and Gershenson provide two explanations for this significant effect of job loss on 
eviction after controlling for changes in household income. First, renting families who have lost 
their jobs have to move out of their housing due to the loss of predictable future income; in other 
words, they may think their incomes cannot be recovered in the short term, so they move out. 
Second, from a landlord’s perspective, falling behind in rent due to job loss can be understood 
differently from other reasons for missing rent payments. Landlords may be uncertain of how 
their unemployed tenants will be able to catch up or pay their rent the next month, and they may 
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evict laid-off tenants more strictly than they do similar tenants who fall behind for other reasons. 
Thus, renters may be more likely to lose their housing when they and their landlords predict that 
they will not be able to recover from their income loss soon.  
Hypothesis 1b. All else equal, a renter will be more likely to experience involuntary 
residential mobility if the renter experiences a deterioration in health conditions that limits his 
or her type of work or the amount of work he or she can perform. Conventionally, health 
conditions have been regarded as human capital (Becker, 1964). A large amount of evidence 
suggests that people in good health are more likely to be economically productive and to have 
higher incomes, whereas disability often reduces labor market productivity (see the review in 
Currie and Madrian (1999)). Moreover, a deterioration in health conditions may cause additional 
medical costs, which can directly raise housing-cost burdens. Therefore, renting families who 
experience a deterioration in their health conditions that affects their working performances may 
predict that they will not recover from their economic circumstances quickly and thus will have 
to move out of their current residences. Or, similar to the logic of the impact of job loss, from a 
landlord’s perspective, these families are not able to pay their rents due to their health conditions, 
so the landlord may more strictly evict these families when they miss rent payments.  
Hypothesis 1c. All else equal, a renter will be less likely to experience involuntary 
residential mobility if the renter possesses more savings and wealth. For several decades, 
building wealth has been regarded as a significant factor in helping poor families to achieve the 
individual well-being derived from long-term economic stability and social protections 
(McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Sherraden, 1991). Undoubtedly, wealth can work as a financial 
cushion to sustain low-income households’ lives during economic downtowns and to help them 
to take advantage of the wide array of opportunities in society (Rosenheck, Bassuk, & Salomon, 
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1998). In a similar logic, wealth may help renters to cope with soaring-housing-cost burdens 
from a short-term perspective. Renters may be able to maintain housing stability via financial 
resources, derived from saving accounts, the sale of possessions, and various forms of credit, 
whereas a lack of wealth may place families at a heightened level of vulnerability to involuntary 
residential mobility.  
Mobility 
 Hypothesis 2. All else equal, a carless renter will be more likely to experience involuntary 
residential mobility. Much evidence points out that an increasing number of affordable rental 
units have become located outside of central cities where families need personal vehicles to 
maintain their daily activities. For example, according to the Joint Center for Housing Studies of 
Harvard University (2015), most affordable single-family rental units—which is currently a 
major source of rental housing supply—exist in non-central cities; to be specific, 42 percent of 
units renting for less than $400 a month are located in non-metro areas and 27 percent in the 
suburbs. Under these market circumstances, having a personal vehicle can be a vital condition 
for accessing affordable housing units, which may allow renting families to maintain housing 
stability.  
Still, in many US cities, non-central areas are not sufficiently served by public 
transportation systems. In this context, numerous studies have pointed out that having a personal 
vehicle is substantially beneficial to low-income households through overcoming a modal 
mismatch. Personal automobiles positively facilitate searching for and commuting to jobs, which 
can directly increase the likelihood of finding and retaining employment (Grengs, 2010; 
Kawabata, 2009). Generally, automobile ownership is related to higher employment rates, higher 
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weekly hours worked, higher hourly earnings (Raphael & Rice, 2002), and shorter 
unemployment duration (Dawkins, Shen, & Sanchez, 2005). 
Within the available literature, no study has examined the relationship between car 
ownership and housing stability. However, having a car may help renters to find and reside in 
affordable housing units distributed over a local housing market, whereas carless families may 
have to choose to reside near public transits (Rosenblatt & DeLuca, 2012). This difference in sets 
of available housing options may affect the ability to maintain housing stability among renters.  
Shared Living Arrangements 
For renters who struggle with paying their soaring rents, housing stability is closely linked to 
social ties. Conventionally, residential mobility entails changes in family composition, such as 
marriage (Rossi, 1955). In the case of involuntary residential mobility, it is also widely known 
household instability, such as separation, divorce, domestic abuse, or other household conflict 
factors—all of which are more likely to happen among low-income households—can trigger 
involuntary residential mobility. Desmond and Perkins (2015) find that housing instability tends 
to be accompanied by household instability—changes in the composition of adults living in a 
same housing unit. They find that more than half of renters experienced household composition 
change accompanied by a recent move in Milwaukee from 2009 to 2011.  
 Hypothesis 3. All else equal, a renter who lives with adult family members or non-family 
members will be less likely to experience involuntary residential mobility. Compared to the role 
of marital status discussed above, little is known about the role of shared living accommodations 
in triggering or reducing involuntary residential mobility even though many low-income renters 
choose to reside in to save money. Mykyta and Macartney (2011)’s work show that the rate of 
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doubled-up households tends to increase during the recent financial crisis. For young adults, 
living with parents can be one option for housing stability if they expect they cannot afford 
housing costs by themselves when they find units in private markets (Wagner & Mulder, 2015). 
When renters experience financial or social shocks, such as marriage dissolution (Feijten & van 
Ham, 2010), they often rely on their families, relatives, or friends. However, some qualitative 
works point out that these shared living arrangements do not always have a positive role in 
providing stable housing, especially, when these living arrangements rely heavily on weak social 
relationships. Sometimes, in response to a lack of housing options in private rental markets, low-
income families decide to live with strangers to reduce their housing or living costs and to share 
some furniture, relying on informal agreements (Desmond, 2016; Skobba & Goetz, 2013). Such 
informal shared living accommodations are easily disturbed by small relationship conflicts, 
which may cause the low-income families to move out unexpectedly. These findings lead me to 
hypothesize that living with adult family members will likely help renting families to avoid 
involuntary residential mobility, whereas living with non-family members will likely push them 
to move out involuntarily.   
Personal Vulnerabilities 
Recently, a group of scholars emphasize several household characteristics that reflect a socially 
vulnerable status in private housing markets (McConnell, 2016; Pendall, Theodos, & Franks, 
2012; Pendall, Theodos, & Hildner, 2016). In other words, some renting families often face 
fewer housing options in private rental markets due to their sociodemographic characteristics. 
Based on the review on existing studies, this study focuses particularly on examining the role of 
three sociodemographic characteristics in experiencing involuntary residential mobility.  
Hypothesis 4a. All else equal, a renter who is a member of a racial or ethnic minority 
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will be more likely to experience involuntary residential mobility.  Racial minorities often have 
higher levels of unemployment and fewer financial and social resources compared to their non-
minority counterparts. Evidence from the American Community Survey shows that minority 
families likely have multiple vulnerabilities associated with precarious housing, such as living in 
overcrowded, deteriorated, or unaffordable housing (Pendall et al., 2012). Also, as a consequence 
of a long history of structural racism in housing markets (Massey & Denton, 1993), many 
African Americans often face racial discrimination in searching for housing units (Galster & 
Godfrey, 2005), which has contributed to racial segregation in many American cities. One logic 
behind this hypothesis is that, if landlords generally prefer to rent their homes to non-minority 
families could have stable jobs and incomes as landlords expect, landlords may more strictly 
evict minority families than non-minority families.  
Hypothesis 4b. All else equal, a renter who has more children in the family will be more 
likely to experience involuntary residential mobility.  The number of children can be a significant 
predictor of involuntary mobility. Landlords often refuse to accept families with children 
searching for one- or two-bedroom apartments due to the concerns about economic costs from 
overcrowding, such as wear-and-tear costs, the increased risk of damage to property, increased 
management costs, noise, increased demands for parking, and so on. They also often screen 
families with children, as they believe that children can cause problems: annoying neighbors or 
attracting unnecessary attention from the police and state agencies (Desmond, 2012).  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the two-person-per-bedroom standard—a widely 
used occupancy standard followed by private landlords since the HUD included this standard in 
the Keating Memo (see Iglesias (2012))—substantially limits the housing choices of families 
with children. According to the analysis that Sander and Iglesias conducted, 28 percent of 
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families in the US who are renters comprise three to five members, and 71 percent of the rental 
apartments consist of studio, one-bedroom, and two-bedroom units. As a result, families with 
children would violate this standard more than 20 times as often as other households would 
(Iglesias, 2012). Desmond and his colleagues (2013) show that, among tenants who appear in 
eviction court, a household with children is more likely to receive an eviction judgement than a 
household without children would in Milwaukee. Thus, I hypothesize that the number of children 
significantly raises the possibility of experiencing involuntary mobility.  
Hypothesis 4c. All else equal, a renter who is an immigrant will be more likely to 
experience involuntary residential mobility.  Immigrants, particularly immigrants after 1990, are 
widely known to likely suffer from housing instability. They are more likely to be renters and to 
have fewer financial and social resources than do native Americans. Moreover, they are 
considered not to be preferred tenants among landlords, as landlords have a clear incentive to 
screen their tenants’ immigration statuses. If landlords rent to unauthorized immigrants, they 
have to pay penalties. As Oliveri (2009) points out, to avoid any difficulty with checking 
potential tenants’ legal statuses, landlords sometimes refuse to rent to seemingly foreign families 
and discriminate against them based on accent, name, appearance, or other ethnic markers. 
According to the Fair Housing Act, national origin is a protected class, so that basically these 
discriminative practices against immigrant families are illegal, but it is still hard to prove that 
immigrant families’ applications are rejected due to their nation origins—landlords may provide 
different reasons for rejection, such as insufficient income or a lack of employment 
information. .Due to the lack of financial and social resources as well as potential discrimination, 




Data and Methods 
This study employs longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which 
is a nationally representative survey of American families (South & Crowder, 1997). The PSID 
began in 1968 with approximately 5,000 families (about 18,000 individuals). The PSID contains 
detailed family-level information, such as residential mobility (e.g., why they moved), housing 
conditions (e.g., the number of people with whom they lived), and socioeconomic transitions 
(e.g., family dissolution or unemployment). One advantage of using the PSID is its longitudinal 
structure, which allows researchers to take advantage of the several statistical advantages, such 
as identifying causal relationships under weak statistical assumptions.  
I delimit the PSID sample in the following ways (see Figure 1). First, I focus on PSID 
observations from 1999 to 2013, which constitute eight interviews with two-year gaps. This 
study period is used because in 1997 a large portion of the PSID sample was dropped and a new 
sample of immigrants—who constitute one group of interest in this study—started to enter the 
data. Also, information on utility costs and health conditions was not collected before 1997.  
A second delimiter, this study focuses on renting families. Being a renter is defined as 
being a renter when a household responded in one survey year as well as in the next one. By this 
definition, my analysis does not include families who were residing outside of housing markets 
(e.g., living in shelters or being institutionalized) and those who were/became homeowners. Due 
to this selection rule, the panel structure happens to be unbalanced; in other words, renters were 




Third, I drop the cases of families who refused or were not able to complete key 
questions relevant to the purpose of this study, such as questions about their reasons for moving, 
housing costs, and employment statuses. The final analytic sample contains 11,853 observations 
in 4,757 renting households.  
[FIGURE 1 IS ABOUT HERE] 
Analytic Approach 
In addressing the research hypotheses, several methodological challenges exist. In this section, I 
explain what those challenges are and how they are addressed in this study. First, to measure the 
degree of involuntariness in a residential move and separate involuntary moves from others, this 
study incorporates multiple measures for housing circumstances and reasons for moves. After 
that, I introduce a list of independent variables that could affect the likelihood of whether a 
household experienced involuntary residential mobility. In the last part of this section, I explain 
the rationale behind applying hybrid models to the PSID renters and specify the model structure.  
Dependent Variable: Involuntary Residential Mobility 
The objective of this study is to understand unstable housing circumstances where renters 
involuntarily move out. In understanding housing instability, however, one challenge is 
determining how to measure the degree of involuntariness for a residential move. A total of 
5,925 observations in the analytic sample undertook residential moves—including both 
voluntary and involuntary moves. To sort out reliable involuntary moves from all moves, I 
consider 1) whether a household was in unstable housing conditions at year t, and 2) a 
retrospective answer for why the renter moved between the times of two surveys conducted at t 
and t+2 years (see Figure 1). 
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First, I consider a move to be potentially involuntary only when it occurred under one of 
the following unstable housing circumstances: (1) a renter was paying more than half of his or 
her household income for housing, (2) the persons-per-room (PPR) was more than 1.5, or (3) a 
renter lived with another household (Blake, Kellerson, & Simic, 2007; Kleit et al., 2016). These 
conditions are widely known as insecure housing circumstances in the existing literature. This 
selection rule allowed to separate 2,155 residential moves from the other moves that did not 
occur under any of these unstable housing circumstances.  
Second, I regard a move as an involuntary move only when a household moved for non-
progressive reasons, following the Freeman’s measure of residential displacement (2005). 
Basically, the PSID data provide nine different reasons for a renter’s move. 1 Among those, three 
answers that reflect non-progressive motivations for moving can be conceptually associated with 
non-progressive residential mobility as Freeman applies: (1) renters moved because they defined 
themselves as homeless, (2) renters moved due to outside events, including demolition, eviction, 
health-related reasons, divorce, or other involuntary reasons, and (3) renters moved for less rent 
or space. Based on this definition, I identify 616 involuntary residential moves (about 5.20 
percent of the eligible sample) from all other moves.  
Taking into account both subjective motivations and objective housing conditions of a 
single move, I believe, can minimize potential bias from possible measurement errors in 
measuring the degree of involuntariness for the move. Thus, the dependent variable is whether a 
household involuntarily moved out between t and t+2 years. In this study, the other residential 
                                                 
1 The nine reasons include (1) purposive productive reasons, such as to take another job, (2) job-related reasons, 
such as to get nearer to work, (3) expansion of housing, such as more space, (4) contraction of housing, such as less 
rent, (5) other housing-related reasons, such as to want to own home, (6) neighborhood of housing, such as better 




moves are assumed to be a voluntary or purposive move that reflects more control over 
residential circumstances than involuntary residential mobility and are regarded as being same as 
other tenants’ decision to stay. 
 
Independent Variables 
To address hypotheses 1a-c, I include the following variables (Table 1): (1) a binary variable that 
measures whether a household head miss work in year t-1 because he/she is unemployed, 
including looking for work, temporarily laid off, or not looking for work (job insecurity) (2) a 
binary variable that measures whether a household head has any health condition that limits the 
type of work or the amount of work that he/she can do in year t (health condition),  and (3) a 
numeric variable that measures the amounts of all account savings (savings), other wealth 
(wealth), and debts (debts) in year t. Savings include cash assets in all accounts, wealth indicates 
all other assets than savings (e.g., value of individual retirement account [IRA]/annuity, non-IRA 
stock, and business/farm), and debts cover debts for the entire family (e.g., credit/store card debt, 
student loan, and medical bills).  
To address hypothesis 2, I include a binary variable that measures whether a household 
owns or leases a car or other vehicle for personal use in year t (car ownership).  
To address hypotheses 3, I include numeric variables that measures the number of adult 
family members who were living together and were neither household heads nor their marriage 
partners (the number of adult family members), and the number of non-family members who 
were living together in year t (the number of non-family members).  
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With respect to hypotheses 4a-c, I include variables that measure personal vulnerability 
characteristics. First, I include two dummy variables that account for the race of a household 
head: whether a household head is African American (African American), and whether the race 
of a household head is non-Black and non-White, such as American Indian, Asian, or Latino 
(other minorities). Second, all renting families in the immigrant sample of the PSID data are 
assigned to the immigrant group, which is captured by a dummy variable (Immigrants, 1 if yes). 
Lastly, I include a variable that measures the number of children under age 18 within a 
household (the number of children in a household).  
Controls 
To estimate unbiased and consistent estimates of the variables related to the research hypotheses, 
it needs to control for the factors that influence the likelihood of experiencing involuntary 
residential mobility.  
First of all, I control for two components of housing-cost-burdens: household income and 
monthly rent. Changes in these two components directly affect the likelihood of involuntary 
residential mobility through increasing or decreasing the housing burdens. Household income is 
measured by the total amount of income during the previous year from all income sources in year 
t (household income). Monthly rent indicates the total amount of rent and utility costs for 
electricity, heating, water, sewer, and others per month in year t (rent).2  
Second, to control for situations where a household has multiple income sources, I 
include two dummy variables that measure the family employment structure in year t: (1) 
                                                 
2 In analytic models, the monthly rent variable is decomposed into two variables; household-specific means of 
monthly rent and deviations from the household-specific mean. The mean part controls for changes in monthly rent 
over time within a household and the deviation part controls for overall levels of rental market segments that the 
household belongs to (e.g., overall housing and neighborhood qualities).  
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whether both a household head and a marriage partner were employed (dual-income family) and 
(2) whether either a household head or a marriage partner was employed (single-income 
family)—whether neither a household head nor a marriage partner was unemployed in the labor 
force serves as a reference group.  
In a similar logic, to control for potential effects from marital status, I include two 
dummy variables: (1) whether a household head was married (married) and (2) whether a 
household head was dissolved (marriage dissolved), including being widowed, divorced, 
annulled, and separated—whether a household head was single serves as a reference group 
(single).  
Since a household receives housing assistance, the household likely avoids involuntary 
residential mobility. So, I control for the effects of housing assistance by including a variable 
that indicates whether a household lives in a housing unit that is subsidized by government 
(housing assistance).  To separate the effect of stipends given to people who were not work 
eligible, I include a variable that indicates whether a household received any income from 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which provides stipends to low-income people who are 
aged 65 or older, blind, or disabled (receiving SSI).  
Lastly, I control for potential year-specific effects, such as effects of the financial crisis 
that began in 2007, or effects of regime changes, by including dummy variables for each year 
(year). Moreover, I control for state-specific effects, such as living in rust-belt cities, or landlord-





In the process of addressing the research hypotheses, one methodological challenge is that the 
personal vulnerability characteristics rarely changed over time. First, the variable of being 
immigrant is time-invariant.3 Second, the variables of being racial or ethnic minorities and the 
number of children within a household also hardly changed over time, probably through 
interracial marriage, marriage dissolution of interracial couples, having another child, or leaving 
parents’ home4. More important, the research objective is to estimate the effects, not of the life 
transitions above, but of being racial or ethnic minorities or having more children within a 
household compared to those without those characteristics. In this context, variations between 
households are particularly vital to identify contextual effects of personal vulnerabilities, which 
would provide descriptive information about the differentiated patterns of involuntary residential 
mobility across different populations. 
To apply the analytical approach that needs to consider within- and between-variations 
simultaneously, this study employs the hybrid model approach (Allison, 2009), also called group 
mean centering in the hierarchical modeling literature (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), or the 
within-between random effects model in a few studies (Bell & Jones, 2015). Additionally, the 
hybrid approach is widely known to be much more flexible and efficient compared to 
conventional panel approaches when researchers handle highly unbalanced panel data (Luke, 
2004). Given the unbalanced structure of the sample in this study, the hybrid model could be a 
more flexible and efficient way of achieving the purpose of this study. 
                                                 
3 The standard deviation of being immigrants between the sample households is 0.283 and the standard deviation 
within the sample households is zero. 
4 The standard deviations of (1) being African American, (2) being other racial and ethnic minorities, and (3) the 
number of children within a household between the sample households are 0.498, 0.247, and 1.183 respectively. The 




 Conventionally, scholars in many disciplines have widely used the fixed-effects (FE) 
approach to analyze panel data. To avoid the problem of heterogeneity bias, the FE approach 
controls out all between-entity effects with the variance, leading to dummy variables for all 
entities (Allison, 2009). Because the FE approach only estimates within-effects by using 
variations within entities, this approach can completely avoid omitted bias from time-invariant 
variations across entities. With this statistical advantage, the FE approach allows researchers to 
estimate more robust results than other cross-sectional approaches.   
However, applying the FE approach often has its costs. By removing or controlling out 
the higher-level variance, FE models necessarily lose a large amount of important information 
obtained from higher-level variance. Moreover, through the FE approach, researchers cannot 
estimate the general between-effects of the variables that are not changed or are rarely changed 
over time, which may indicate significant contextual effects. As mentioned above, this limitation 
of the FE approach is critical in in the context of this study, estimating the effects of personal 
vulnerability characteristics that rarely change over time. 
As an alternative analytic approach, the hybrid model allows to overcome the limitation 
of the FE approach, while simultaneously maintaining the advantages of using panel data—
providing policy-relevant inferences under weaker statistical assumptions than do statistical 
models. In this modeling approach, each variable is decomposed into two parts: (1) deviations 
from their household-specific means—i.e., within components—and (2) household-specific 
means of the time-varying variables—i.e., between components. This decomposition allows to 
estimate the between-effects derived from variations between households, as well as the within-
effects derived from variations within each household separately.  
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In this study, since personal vulnerability characteristics show small variations within 
each household, I transform those variables into a form of household-specific means and 
consider them time-invariant variables (“𝑧𝑗” in the Equation 2). Other than these variables, I 
decompose the other independent variables into two parts: (1) deviations from their household-
specific means (“𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥?̅?” in Equation 1), and (2) household-specific means (“𝑥?̅?” in Equation 2). 
After the decomposition, the set of deviations from household-specific means is used to estimate 
within-effects of the independent variables other than personal vulnerability characteristics as a 
conventional FE model does. The set of the household-specific means is used as a control 
variable to estimate the contextual effects of the personal vulnerability variables (Bell & Jones, 
2015). The basic model structure is as follows: 
Equation 1: 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑜𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥?̅?) + 𝑒𝑖𝑗  and 
Equation 2: 𝛽𝑜𝑗 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑥?̅? + 𝑢𝑗 , 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗is the dependent variable (in this study, whether a household experienced involuntary 
residential mobility between t and t+2 years), 𝑥𝑖𝑗 refers to a series of the independent variables 
other than personal vulnerabilities, 𝑥?̅? is household-specific means of the independent variables 
other than personal vulnerabilities, 𝑧𝑗 indicates household-specific means of the personal 
vulnerability characteristics, 𝛽𝑜 is an intercept, 𝛽1𝑗 refers to coefficients that indicate within-
effects of 𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝛽2 refers to coefficients that indicate effects of personal vulnerabilities, 𝛽3 refers to 
coefficients that indicate between-effects of 𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑢𝑗  is a random coefficient for household j, and 
𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a residual for observation i of household j. To control for year- and state-specific effects, 
the hybrid models in this study include dummy variables for each year and state; to be specific, 
the year dummies are included in all analytic models, but the state dummies are only included 
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when the models estimate between-effects of personal vulnerabilities that are derived from 
variations between households, perhaps living in different states.  
Additionally, unlike the standard hybrid model, I apply the hybrid model as a form of a 
logistic model to avoid any statistical problems generated by the nonlinear outcome. Compared 
to linear hybrid models, non-linear hybrid models may not work well under certain conditions, 
but the expected bias would be marginal in most common data situations (Allison, 2014). 
Results 
Table 2 presents the results from six hybrid models. Here, because household-specific means of 
the independent variables other than personal vulnerabilities are used as a control variable (“𝛽3” 
in Equation 2), the estimated coefficients of those variables are not presented.  
First, I begin with a model that includes only the control variables associated with a 
housing-cost-burden, household employment structure, and housing and welfare policies (Model 
1). Not surprisingly, renters are more likely to experience involuntary residential mobility, as 
their rents increase and as their household incomes decrease over time. Model 1 also displays the 
significant effect of housing assistance—receiving rent subsidies or living in public housing. 
However, being single-income households, being dual-income households, and receiving 
subsidies from SSI did not have a significant relationship with involuntary residential mobility. 
Therefore, these variables are not retained in the remaining models. 
To address hypotheses 1a-c, I estimate the effects of job insecurity, limiting health 
condition, savings, wealth, and debts. Model 2 displays evidence showing that renters are more 
likely to experience involuntary residential mobility when their jobs become insecure than when 
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their jobs are secure. The estimated coefficient shows that being unstably employed increases the 
log-odds of involuntary mobility by 0.276—even after controlling for household income.  
In addition, Model 2 shows that renters are more likely to experience involuntary 
mobility when their health conditions for working performance are limited compared to when the 
conditions are not—after controlling for household income and job insecurity. Even though this 
effect is marginally significant, perhaps due to the correlation between limiting health conditions 
and job insecurity, the estimated coefficient shows that being in deteriorated health conditions 
increases the log-odds of involuntary mobility by 0.350.5   
Model 2 also supports the argument that savings can work as a financial cushion helping 
renting families to maintain housing stability; having $1,000 in saving accounts reduces the 
likelihood of moving out involuntarily by 0.022. However, I find no significant effect of wealth 
and debts. This result implies that compared to other types of wealth, having more savings, 
which are a type of wealth that can be easily converted to cash, directly reduces the likelihood of 
involuntary mobility.  
To address hypothesis 2, Model 2 displays the significant effect of having a car which 
significantly reduces the likelihood of experiencing involuntary moves by 0.426. It means a 
renter is less likely to experience involuntary mobility when the renter has a vehicle compared to 
when the renter does not.  
                                                 
5 Statistically speaking, estimating coefficients by using variations within a household must sacrifice statistical 
efficiency to achieve unbiasedness of the coefficients (Plümper & Troeger, 2007). Even though the hybrid models in 
this study include a large number of observations for estimation, only a limited number of them are actually used to 
estimate coefficients of deviations from household-specific means, which directly affect the efficiency of each 
model. Thus, in this study, I decide to interpret the significant findings at the 10 percent significant level, some of 
which may not be strong evidence.  
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To address hypothesis 3, Model 3 estimates the effects of family composition 
characteristics on involuntary mobility. It presents evidence showing that more non-family 
members the renter lives with, the more likely they are to move involuntarily. However, Model 3 
shows no evidence on significant effects of being married, being dissolved, and living with adult 
family members on involuntary mobility.  
To address hypotheses 4a-c, I add the personal vulnerability variables as a form of 
household-specific means of the variables to the previous model. Also, Model 4 includes state 
dummies to control for state-specific effects that could affect variations between households.6 
Model 4 displays evidence showing that renters having more children are at higher risk of 
involuntary residential mobility. The result shows that, as a family has one more child, the log-
odd of involuntary mobility increases by 0.149. Different from my expectation, Model 4 shows 
that African-American renters are less likely to experience involuntary mobility. To specify this 
significant effect of being African American, I additionally estimate several interaction terms in 
the following model. Other minority and immigrant families show no significant relationship 
with involuntary residential mobility.  
Based on the result that involuntary residential mobility is closely related to two groups, 
African American households and households with children, I estimate two additional models. 
These models are intended to explore potential differentiated effects among these groups. Here, I 
present only significant results.  
Model 5 adds several interaction terms between being African-American and other 
independent variables. To begin with, the effect size of housing costs is larger among African-
                                                 
6 Because no involuntary mobility occurs in some states, 150 observations are dropped. 
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American households; this means they tend to easily experience involuntary residential mobility 
in response to changes in housing costs. To be specific, the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term means the difference between the log-odds ratio corresponding to a change in 
rent by $1,000 among White households and the log-odds ratio corresponding to a change in rent 
by $1,000 among amongst African American households and the difference shows the log-odds 
ratio among African American households are higher than White households by 0.420. 
In Model 5, the effect of wealth other than savings among White households appears to 
be significant—savings do not show any significant difference. This change means White 
households that have larger amounts of wealth are less likely to experience involuntary 
residential mobility. However, this positive effect is largely cancelled out among African-
American families. Moreover, by adding the interaction terms, the effect of being married ends 
up being significant among White households; in other words, White renters are less likely to 
experience involuntary residential mobility when they are married. This positive effect of 
marriage found among White households, however, is largely cancelled out among African-
American renters.  
Model 6 adds several interaction terms between the number of children within a 
household and other variables. Here, I only present the significant results. In Model 6, the effect 
size of household income becomes relatively small as households have more children; in other 
words, households that have more children tend to easily experience involuntary residential 
mobility in response to changes in household incomes. Moreover, renters that have more 
children are much more likely to experience involuntary residential mobility after their marriage 
relationships are dissolved compared to renters that have less children.  
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Regarding the findings introduced above, I estimate several additional models to address 
several issues (not presented). First, some may be concerned about the possibility that the 
positive effect of having a car comes from selling the car. To separate out this effect of having an 
automobile, so called wealth effect, I estimate another model based on Model 3 by including one 
more variable that measures whether a renter sold a car between year t and year t+2. The result 
shows no significant effect of selling a car and, whereas the effect of having a car (β=-0.492, 
SE=0.215) remains significant at the 5 percent significant level after controlling for the effect of 
selling a car.  
One concern may exist about the negative effect of the number of non-family members 
who are living together. The operationalized definition of involuntary mobility in this study 
already considers doubled-up housing situations as one type of unstable housing circumstances 
before experiencing involuntary residential mobility, so this operationalization may influence the 
result. To reduce any statistical problem from this endogenity, I estimate another model 
considering only two types of unstable housing circumstances in measuring involuntary 
residential mobility, a severe-housing-cost-burden and living in overcrowded housing. With this 
modified definition, the result still shows that the number of non-family members that are living 
together (β=0.250, SE= 0.75) significantly increases the likelihood of experiencing involuntary 
residential mobility at the 0.1 percent significance level.  
Lastly, I estimate weighted hybrid logistic models, even though some statisticians are 
skeptical about whether weighting actually improves panel analyses (Himelein, 2014). As a 
result, I find no real difference in the estimated coefficients of key independent variables.  
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Discussion and Policy Implications 
Due to the shortage of affordable housing in the United States, an increasing number of renters 
are struggling with housing instability. However, few explanations exist for why some renters 
keep housing in response to increasing-housing-cost burdens whereas others move. Applying 
hybrid models to a nationwide panel dataset, this study investigates empirically the effects of 
economic security, mobility, family composition, and personal vulnerabilities on involuntary 
residential mobility. Through this examination, I find several findings that overturn the common 
presumption that housing instability is a simple consequence of a high-housing-cost burden, 
although that is part of the picture.  
First, the findings consistently support the argument that renters are more likely to 
experience involuntary residential mobility when they face the loss of predictable future income 
and have no wealth to cover the loss. To be specific, insecure employment, a deterioration in 
health conditions, and a lack of savings significantly increase the likelihood of involuntary 
mobility. These results imply that an increasing-housing-cost burden as a shock is more likely to 
cause involuntary residential mobility when the shock is combined with the absence of ability to 
respond to the shock. For example, as presented in Table 3, the predicted probability of 
experiencing involuntary mobility increases about five percent when a renter experiences an 
income loss that entails job insecurity and limiting health conditions compared to when the renter 
experiences only the income loss—under the assumption that a monthly rent increases by $1,000 
and a household income decreases by $5,000. The findings also imply that involuntary 
residential mobility is the problem that intensifies along with widening health and wealth 
disparities in the Unites States. 
[TABLE 3 IS ABOUT HERE] 
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Second, car ownership works as a significant condition for renters to avoid involuntary 
residential mobility. By having a car, renters may be able to choose housing units that they can 
afford in the first place, or their relocation may be perceived as more purposive and intentional 
due to extended housing options. On the contrary, carless renters may have to choose housing 
units near existing public transit lines for commuting or daily activities, even though they cannot 
fully afford those units. Table 3 shows that the predicted probability of experiencing involuntary 
mobility increases about three percent when a renter has no personal vehicle compared to when 
the renter has at least one vehicle.  
Third, involuntary residential mobility is closely associated with family or non-family 
members with which renters live. The findings support the argument that, for some renters, 
housing stability depends on the stability of social relationships (Skobba & Goetz, 2013). The 
results show no evidence suggesting that shared living arrangements help households avoiding 
involuntary residential mobility. Rather, the results show that they are much more likely to 
experience involuntary residential mobility as renters live with more non-family members that 
reflect housing circumstances relying on relatively unstable social relationships. For example, 
Table 3 shows that the predicted probability of experiencing involuntary mobility when a renter 
experiences soars as the number of non-family members that a household lives with increases. 
The number of adult family members that renters live with reduces the likelihood of 
experiencing involuntary residential mobility, but this coefficient is not significant. These results 
are consistent with the mixed role of shared living arrangements in the existing literature; those 
arrangements could help renters being stable housed, but those could cause renters to move out.  
Fourth, households with more children are particularly more likely to experience 
involuntary mobility. It implies that potential barriers that hinder larger households from 
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achieving housing stability exist. The barriers could be a lack of rental units for larger families, a 
lack of affordable childcare services, or discriminative practices against children by landlords. 
Table 3 indicates that the predicted probability of experiencing involuntary mobility increases by 
about five percent when a household has three children compared to when the household has no 
child. This result supports the argument by Iglesias (2012) that the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard—a widely used occupancy standard followed by private landlords— substantially limits 
the housing choices of families with children. This finding is also consistent with the literature 
showing high rates of eviction among families with children (Desmond et al., 2013). 
Fifth, the results suggest that changes in household income and rents affect involuntary 
residential mobility differently across different populations; to be specific, African-American 
households are more likely to experience involuntary mobility in response to changes in rent, and 
households that have more children are more likely to experience involuntary mobility in 
response to changes in household income.  
Sixth, even though the focus of this study is not on evaluating the role of marital status in 
housing instability, the findings suggest that involuntary residential mobility is closely associated 
with marriage and marriage dissolution events. To be specific, African-American households are 
more likely to experience involuntary mobility after they are married, and households that have 
more children are more likely to experience involuntary mobility when their marriage 
relationships are dissolved. This result is consistent with the finding of Desmond and Perkins 
(2015) suggesting that housing instability is associated with household instability in different 
ways across sociodemographic groups.  
This study has several limitations. First, the estimated coefficients of the personal 
vulnerability variables may not be completely free from omitted bias from time-invariant factors. 
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This remaining variation between households can be explained by the factors that affect a 
landlord’s screening process, such as a criminal record, an eviction record, or credit problems, 
each of which rarely changes from a short-term perspective and has not been included in the 
analytic models. As described in the Desmond (2016)’s work, oftentimes landlords use websites 
for checking the criminal, eviction, or legal records or credit histories of applicants by paying a 
few dollars. Due to the lack of available data on these topics, however, the empirical models 
cannot take these factors into account. Second, because the PSID data has two-year gaps, the 
analytic models do not consider any moves that happened in the time between the two survey 
waves. This limitation may underestimate the seriousness of housing instability among renters 
who have to move multiple times within a year. In addition, the sample of this study excludes 
households that became living outside of housing markets due to involuntary residential mobility 
because the PSID data does not provide specific reasons for why a household became outside of 
housing markets. This selection rule may underestimate the results of this study by excluding 
households that suffer from the most severe degree of housing instability. Third, due to the data 
availability, this paper does not clearly explain which one is the main source of involuntary 
residential mobility is, limited housing options or the ability to maintain residence. Renters may 
experience involuntary residential mobility because they had to choose housing units due to 
limited housing options at the first place. However, they may experience involuntary residential 
mobility because they are not capable to maintain their residence—in other words, they tend to 
be strictly evicted.  
Despite the study limitations, this study responds to the policy need for understanding the 
mechanisms of housing instability. This study underscores the need for housing researchers and 
policymakers to focus their attention on detailed dynamics within a household as an indicator of 
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the ability that allows renting families to maintain housing stability. To be specific, housing 
researchers and policymakers can identify differentiated housing needs for housing stability by 
asking detailed questions; for example, how many members within a family have the ability to 
work, what kinds of jobs they can do, how vulnerable a family’s financial circumstance is to 
minor shocks, how many months a household can pay rents without income, with whom a 
household is living, with whom the household lived before, how stable the relationship with 
them is, how many children the household has, and so on. These questions could help 
understanding how to measure the vulnerability to involuntary residential mobility among 
unsubsidized renters.  
This study highlights the necessity of investigating exactly why households with children 
are more likely to experience involuntary residential mobility. One explanation is that rental 
housing options are substantially limited among them. A few housing scholars have pointed out 
that the burden of those occupancy standards is disproportionately on families with children. 
These families may have to maintain living in larger apartments even though they cannot afford 
those units (Iglesias, 2012), or they may have to violate occupancy limits created and enforced 
by landlords which makes them lying at even weaker positions in the relationship with their 
landlords (Desmond, 2012). In the similar context, housing researchers and policymakers need to 
pay attention to whether generalizable patterns of discrimination against families with children 
exist in rental housing markets. Even though the Fair Housing Act clearly prohibits landlords 
refusing applicants due to family composition, particularly the existence of children, as 
Desmond’s qualitative study (2012) identifies, the discrimination against families with children 
happens implicitly and frequently.  
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Lastly, the positive effect of having an automobile is noteworthy, as supporting car 
ownership can be a more actionable tool compared to the economic and sociodemographic 
characteristics discussed above. Policymakers may need to think about improving the access to 
personal vehicles as an alternative way of providing affordable housing and achieving housing 
instability. This approach may reduce barriers against newly supplied rental housing units 
located outside of central cities. Moreover, having a car provides housing stability through 
stabilizing household income and employment (Dawkins et al., 2005). Although few housing 
policy studies have examined the relationship between having an automobile and housing 
options in private markets, among subsidized renters, having a car is a crucial condition for 
living in a better neighborhood; they are likely to live and stay in areas with lower poverty rates, 
higher social statuses, stronger housing markets, and lower health risks (Pendall et al., 2014).  
Moreover, the role of having an automobile as a policy tool in reducing housing 
instability needs to be understood in trade-off relationships between transportation and housing 
costs. Recently, housing researchers have increasingly examined these relationships by using the 
Location Affordability Index (LAI), which provides information about combined cost of housing 
and transportation (e.g., Greenlee and Wilson (2016)). The development of LAI could help 
understanding whether/how exactly car ownership helps renters achieving housing stability.  
Many questions remain unanswered about why certain renters are more likely to move 
involuntarily. First, it is possible that household characteristics, not measured in this research, 
such as a criminal record, an eviction record, or credit problems, predict involuntary residential 
mobility. Second, more thought should be dedicated to trade-off relationships between 
transportation and housing costs that could affect involuntary residential mobility. For example, 
if low-income renters move to affordable housing units through bearing more transportation 
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costs, does that decision enable the renters to maintain housing stability? Third, although some 
researchers have examined spatial variation in rental housing market, mostly controlled out or 
not measured in this study, we have very little information on how local housing market 
characteristics, such as market tightness, compression of rents, diversity of unit sizes, or renter 
protections, affect housing instability. To understand the variations, we may need to examine in 
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Figure 1. Description of Analytic Sample Selection and Categorization of Residential Mobility 
 
Note 1. Each observation is a household living in rental housing units. By this definition, the sample does not 
include households who were residing outside of housing markets (e.g., living in shelters or being institutionalized) 





Table 1. Independent Variables and Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name 
Involuntary Movers Others 
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Economic Insecurity         
Job insecurity  0.240 0.427 0.000 1.000 0.120 0.325 0.000 1.000 
Limiting health condition  0.271 0.445 0.000 1.000 0.184 0.388 0.000 1.000 
Savings (unit: $1,000) 1.925 7.671 0.000 1.000 6.184 31.025 0.000 800.000 
Wealth except savings (unit: $1,000) 5.243 14.068 0 330.200 26.056 137.698 0.000 3815.785 
Debt (unit: $1,000) 8.151 26.272 0 250.000 9.148 28.444 0.000 1000.000 
Mobility         
         Car ownership 0.625 0.485 0.000 1.000 0.773 0.419 0.000 1.000 
Marital Status         
         Married 0.101 0.305 0.000 1.000 0.223 0.416 0.000 1.000 
Marriage dissolved 0.295 0.456 0.000 1.000 0.342 0.474 0.000 1.000 
Single (reference category) 0.602 0.490 0.000 1.000 0.435 0.496 0.000 1.000 
Shared Living Arrangements         
The number of adult family members 0.817 1.233 0.000 4.000 0.247 0.549 0.000 5.000 
The number of non-family members 0.602 0.490 0.000 7.000 0.286 0.872 0.000 10.000 
Personal Vulnerabilities         
Black 0.333 0.472 0.000 1.000 0.257 0.437 0.000 1.000 
Other non-Black minorities 0.089 0.285 0.000 1.000 0.096 0.294 0.000 1.000 
Immigrant 0.105 0.307 0.000 1.000 0.116 0.320 0.000 1.000 
The number of children in a household 0.640 1.217 0.000 7.000 0.596 1.069 0.000 11.000 
Housing Cost Burden         
Household income (unit: $1,000) 28.148 23.311 0.000 178.906 41.241 39.096 0.000 602.000 
Monthly rent (unit: $1,000) 0.691 0.486 0.020 4.000 0.717 0.565 0.024 22.495 
Household Employment Structure         
Single-income households  0.606 0.489 0.000 1.000 0.620 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Dual-income households 0.041 0.198 0.000 1.000 0.131 0.338 0.000 1.000 
Housing and welfare policies         
Receiving housing assistance 0.120 0.326 0.000 1.000 0.169 0.375 0.000 1.000 
         Receiving SSI 0.010 0.098 0.000 1.000 0.071 0.257 0.000 1.000 
N 613 11,164 
Note 1: Descriptive statistics are weighted by using the PSID family weights. 
Note 2: Because households who return to the PSID study after skipping one or more surveys, so called reappearers, have no weight value, three households are 
dropped in the group of involuntary movers 
Note 3: Observations in the group of others include those who did not relocate between t and t+2 years and those who move due to progressive reasons or who 
move under stable housing circumstances.  
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Table 2. Hybrid Logistic Regression Models of Experiencing Involuntary Mobility 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Dependent Variable: whether a household experienced an involuntary residential mobility between year t and t+2 (yes=1) 
Deviations from household-specific 
means (𝛽1𝑗  in Equation 1) 
          
  
Housing Cost Burden             
Monthly rent (unit: $1,000) 0.752*** 0.214 0.859*** 0.215 1.358*** 0.224 1.304*** 0.225 0.935*** 0.291 0.911** 0.290 
Household income (unit: $1,000) -0.009* 0.004 -0.008* 0.004 -0.008* 0.004 -0.008* 0.004 -0.007+ 0.004 -0.012** 0.005 
Household Employment Structure             
Single-income households 
(yes=1) -0.021 0.176 
        
  
Dual-income households (yes=1) -0.360 0.327           
Housing and Welfare Policies             
Receiving housing assistance 
(yes=1) -1.005*** 0.205 -1.006*** 0.206 -0.777*** 0.208 -0.758*** 0.208 -0.717*** 0.209 -0.725*** 0.208 
Receiving SSI (yes=1) 0.215 0.241           
Economic Insecurity             
Job insecurity (yes=1)   0.276* 0.141 0.293* 0.143 0.289* 0.143 0.293* 0.144 0.279+ 0.143 
Limiting health condition (yes=1)   0.350+ 0.201 0.366+ 0.207 0.371+ 0.210 0.363+ 0.210 0.363+ 0.210 
Savings (unit: $1,000)   -0.022* 0.009 -0.024* 0.010 -0.023* 0.009 -0.021* 0.009 -0.020* 0.009 
Wealth (unit: $1,000)   -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.008+ 0.004 -0.009* 0.004 
Debts (unit: $1,000)   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mobility             
Car ownership (yes=1)   -0.426* 0.177 -0.366* 0.181 -0.367* 0.179 -0.409* 0.180 -0.421* 0.180 
Marital Status (reference: single)             
Married (yes=1)     -0.230 0.471 -0.251 0.461 -1.462* 0.636 -1.355* 0.624 
Marriage Dissolved (yes=1)     -0.514 0.551 -0.553 0.542 -1.529+ 0.843 -2.192* 0.910 
Shared Living Arrangements             
The number of adult family 
members 
    
-0.077 0.135 -0.080 0.135 -0.106 0.136 -0.122 0.133 
The number of non-family 
members 
    
0.476*** 0.060 0.484*** 0.060 0.497*** 0.061 0.495*** 0.061 
Personal Vulnerabilities 
(𝛽2 in Equation 2) 
            
African American (yes=1) 
(reference: White American) 
      
-0.247* 0.124 -0.278* 0.126 -0.296* 0.126 
Other non-African American 
minorities (yes=1) 
      
-0.193 0.270 -0.219 0.271 -0.216 0.272 
Immigrant (yes=1)       -0.104 0.233 -0.068 0.233 -0.087 0.233 
The number of children in 
household 
      
0.149*** 0.040 0.144*** 0.040 0.125** 0.040 
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Interaction Terms between Deviations 
from household-specific means and 
being African American 
            
African American × Monthly rent         0.420* 2.070 0.420+ 1.890 
African American × Wealth         0.007* 2.270 0.008 0.890 
African American × Married         0.887** 2.570 0.874* 2.320 
African American × Dissolved         1.101 1.540 1.088 1.150 
Interaction Terms between Family 
Composition and the number of 
children in a family 
            
The number of children in 
household × Household income 
          
0.003* 2.240 
The number of children in 
household × Wealth 
          
0.004+ 1.860 
The number of children in 
household × Married 
          
0.389 0.930 
The number of children in 
household × Dissolved 
          
0.337* 2.020 
Household-specific means 7 
(𝛽3 in Equation 3) 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
State dummy variables Not included Not included Not included Included Included Included 
Intercept (𝛽0 ) -3.585
*** 0.264 -3.581*** 0.266 -3.682*** 0.279 -3.056*** 0.727 -3.016*** 0.731 -2.920*** 0.733 
Random Coefficient (𝑢𝑗  ) 0.514* 0.200 0.574** 0.205 0.609** 0.212 0.444* 0.202 0.476* 0.206 0.471* 0.206 
ICC 0.135** 0.045 0.149** 0.045 0.156*** 0.046 0.119* 0.048 0.126** 0.048 0.125** 0.048 
Log Likelihood -2242.721 -2214.249 -2149.322 -2105.273 -2096.2368 -2090.460 
BIC 4673.050 4672.385 4617.573 4950.627 4970.027 4986.577 
N8 11,853 (4,757) 11,853 (4,757) 11,853 (4,757) 11,709 (4,701) 11,709 (4,701) 11,709 (4,701) 
Note 1. ICC: Interclass correlation, BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion, 𝛽0: Constant, 𝑈0: Level-2 random coefficient. 
Note 2. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
  
                                                 
7 Household-specific means include the means of the independent variables other than personal vulnerability characteristics.  
8 The numbers of N indicate the total numbers of observations used in each model and the numbers in parenthesis indicate the total numbers of households used in each model. 
46 
 
Table 3. Predicted Probabilities of Experiencing Involuntary Residential Mobility from Model 4 
Type Condition Predicted Probability 
Base hypothetical condition: a monthly rent increases by $1,000 and a household income decreases by $5,000 
Economic Security 
Only income loss (-$5,000) 0.113 
Income loss (-$5,000) + Job insecurity (yes=1) 0.144 
Income loss (-$5,000) + Limiting health conditions (yes=1) 0.154 
Income loss (-$5,000) + Job insecurity (yes=1) + Limiting health conditions (yes=1) 0.193 
No savings and other wealth 0.113 
$20,000 savings 0.076 
$20,000 wealth other than savings 0.109 
$20,000 savings + $20,000 wealth other than savings 0.073 
Mobility 
Having no automobile 0.113 
Having at least one automobile 0.083 
Shared Living 
Arrangements 
Not living with non-family members 0.113 
Living with one non-family member 0.167 
Living with four non-family members 0.424 
The Number of 
Children 
Having no child 0.100 
Having one child 0.114 
Having three children 0.148 
Note. Other variables in Model 3 are set to their mean values. 
 
 
